

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 9 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. TARABANOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.A. von PLATEN
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. El-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. B.T. PRICE

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the thirty-fourth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

You will remember that, as agreed between the two co-Chairmen, to-day's discussion is to be on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. LALL (India): The eight delegations that presented the joint memorandum circulated as document ENDC/28, dated 16 April 1962, wish me to say that the purpose and objective of the joint memorandum remain as expressed in the statement made by Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, on 19 April 1962. (ENDC/PV.24, pages 5-7)

Recent statements of the nuclear Powers, both in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and in plenary meetings of the Conference, lead us to repeat that our common purpose remains as expressed in the statement of the representative of Ethiopia. We do not intend to interpret individually the joint memorandum, which stands by itself and offers a good basis for negotiations among the Powers concerned.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to speak now as the representative of Bulgaria at this Conference.

I am very glad to hear the short statement made by the representative of India on behalf of the eight non-aligned nations, concerning the joint memorandum they have submitted. I think his explanation of the position should - and will - be taken into consideration in our future discussions.

I should now like to make a few comments on the subject of our discussion today: the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. At the beginning of the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a long discussion took place in the Sub-Committee set up to find a solution for the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. That discussion could not be brought to a successful conclusion because the Western nuclear Powers maintained fixed positions. It will be remembered that the object of those positions was to secure the on-site inspection by an international body of seismic phenomena which might be declared by some to be of doubtful origin, thus establishing a system of control which, in the absence of any disarmament measures, would immediately turn into espionage.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, on the basis of the experience gained in atomic and nuclear tests since the first atomic tests were carried out by the United States in 1945, and also on the basis of the most recent scientific data

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on the development of seismological technique, took the position that it was not necessary to establish a system of compulsory international control and on-site inspection, because existing national detection systems were fully adequate for detecting and identifying all events of this nature. At the same time, the Soviet Union most aptly demonstrated not only the uselessness, but also the negative effect on the international situation of establishing an international control commission with wide powers to organize the control and verification of allegedly doubtful events supposed to have occurred in various parts of the world.

In these circumstances the discussion in the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, which lasted several weeks, had no positive results. On the contrary, a deadlock was reached on the question of nuclear tests both in the Sub-Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, at the very time when the United States had been carrying on its underground tests for many months and when that country and the United Kingdom were preparing to carry out tests in the atmosphere in the vicinity of Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean.

Rightly concerned to see the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in an impasse, the non-aligned nations submitted on 16 April a joint memorandum on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. (ENDC/28) In that document they made an earnest appeal to the nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to come as soon as possible to an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time. The non-aligned countries urged the nuclear Powers to consider the ideas and proposals put forward in the joint memorandum.

These proposals include the following:

1. The establishment, by agreement, of a system for continuous observation and effective control by existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or by certain of the existing posts designated for the purpose by agreement.

At the same time, the eight non-aligned countries note in their document, that the existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of man-made explosions.

2. The constitution, by agreement, of an international commission consisting of highly-qualified scientists from non-aligned countries. That commission would be responsible for processing all data received from the observation posts, and the parties to the treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests would

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undertake to furnish it with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event. Pursuant to that obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories or the site of the doubtful event.

3. Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a doubtful event, the party concerned would undertake to give full and complete co-operation and to consult with the Commission as to what further measures, including on-site verification, could be taken to facilitate identification of the event in question, such measures also to include the invitation provided for in paragraph 4 of the joint memorandum, which the country where the doubtful event had been detected might extend to the Commission to visit its territory for an inspection.

Lastly, the non-aligned countries urged the nuclear Powers to consider their proposals and suggestions with a view to reaching, as soon as possible, an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time.

As early as 19 April the Soviet Government, in a solemn declaration (ENDC/32), expressed its willingness to consider the proposals put forward in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries and to take that document as a basis for further negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It thus replied affirmatively to the appeal made to all the nuclear Powers by the authors of the joint memorandum. By that declaration the Soviet Government showed its eagerness to break the deadlock caused by the intransigence of the Western powers, by adopting a new compromise position in conformity with the desires, suggestions and proposals of the non-aligned nations.

What was, and still is, the attitude of the Western Powers to the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries?

On 20 April Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, said that his Prime Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons which showed the United Kingdom position with the utmost clarity.

According to Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom Prime Minister said:

"... if the neutrals' proposals provide for effective measures of international verification and if the Russians ... agree to this, negotiation will become possible".

Mr. Godber went on to say that, when the Prime Minister was asked again to clarify just what the neutrals' proposals were, he replied:

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"As I understand it, the proposals would not make verification compulsory; it would be only permissive".

That was the opinion of the Prime Minister, who continued as follows:

"But if it is to be only permissive we are really back where we stood before". That is to say, at the beginning of all the

discussions on nuclear tests "The question is: is it to be compulsory or permissive?" (ENDC/PV.25, page 9)

Thus, according to the United Kingdom Prime Minister as reported here by Mr. Godber in his statement of 20 April, the control proposed in the eight-nation joint memorandum was not compulsory but only permissive. That is a point we wish to stress at once. And, to quote the United Kingdom Prime Minister again, if control "is to be only permissive we are really back where we stood before".

Thus, if control is to be only permissive we should, according to this interpretation of the position adopted by the United Kingdom and, it must be added, by the United States, be back at the starting point of the discussion on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Hence, in view of the provisions of the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, and since the control proposed in that memorandum is not compulsory but only permissive, it must be admitted that, according to the United Kingdom and the United States, we are in exactly the same position as before.

True, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom later tried several times to make it appear that they were taking document ENDC/28 as a starting point, as a basis for discussion, for reaching an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Indeed, in his statement to the Conference on 7 May Sir Michael Wright, the United Kingdom representative, said:

"Both the United States and the United Kingdom delegations not only have accepted the eight-Power memorandum as a basis of discussion, but have, in the nuclear Sub-Committee, been trying to make a beginning in the task of constructive negotiation upon it. I emphasize the word 'negotiation'."

(ENDC/PV.32, page 6)

There can be no doubt that this change - which is only apparent - in the attitude of the Western nuclear Powers, and their obvious though belated desire to make out that they accept the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations as a basis for discussion and negotiation, is to be accounted for by

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tactical reasons due to the pressure of world opinion. The Western Powers are afraid of appearing before world opinion in a bad light because they oppose a compromise on the discontinuance of nuclear tests based on the joint memorandum of the non-aligned nations.

But this desire to show themselves in a better light before world opinion is contradicted, not only by the initial positions taken in the statements and explanations given by the most eminent representatives of the Western countries, but also by the position of the Western delegations - especially those of the United States and the United Kingdom - at our meeting on 7 May and in the previous discussion in the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. For Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, said on 7 May that "... the three nuclear Powers have been attempting to determine what sort of mutually acceptable arrangements might be devised in regard to a nuclear test ban treaty if we assume, for present purposes, that the eight-nation plan will be a basis or one of the bases for negotiations." I repeat: "... if we assume, for present purposes, that the eight-nation plan will be a basis or one of the bases for negotiations." (ENDC/PV.32, page 14) It would really be difficult to express the position of the Western countries with regard to the memorandum more conditionally.

Moreover, the position of the Western States was made sufficiently clear by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, who, in the communiqué published after their recent meeting in Washington, did not even mention the step taken by the non-aligned countries, and said they regretted that the Soviet Government had not been willing - according to them - to join in any effective treaty which would end nuclear tests. Is this not clear and convincing evidence that the United States and the United Kingdom are not prepared to negotiate on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum - on the basis of the compromise proposed by the non-aligned countries to break the deadlock in the present talks?

At the same time the Western Powers, both in the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests and in the Conference, are making unfounded accusations against the Soviet Union, alleging that it does not accept the joint memorandum of the non-aligned nations, or that it claims the right to accept only its own interpretation of that document. Such accusations are intended to mislead world opinion, which is following our debates with close attention, and even, if possible, to mislead the participants in this Conference, by making them believe that it is the Soviet

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Union that is responsible for the deadlock really brought about by the Western Powers in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

According to Mr. Dean, "The fundamental difficulty is that the Soviet Union has given its own interpretation to the joint memorandum, and then the Soviet Union insists that this is the only possible interpretation." (ENDC/PV.32, page 16) That is what the Soviet Union is supposed to claim. But we know from the statements of the Soviet delegation during our discussions, and also from the statement issued by the Soviet Government on 19 April (ENDC/32) and put before our Conference only three days after the memorandum of the non-aligned nations, that the Soviet Union accepted that memorandum as a basis and even described it as a constructive contribution.

What was the position of the Western Powers in regard to this same memorandum? They began by asking the co-authors of this important document on the day it was submitted - or the day after - about twenty questions designed to cast doubt on nearly all the suggestions made by the non-aligned countries.

Again, in his statement of 7 May Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, trying to interpret the thought of the co-authors of the memorandum, said that his reading of the document reinforced his belief that the eight nations agreed on "the obligatory or indispensable nature of on-site inspections".

(ibid., page 21) Mr. Dean added the same day:

"This view of the eight-nation proposal is indeed supported by our reading of its terms. Indeed, if this had not been the case my delegation would not have been able to inform the twenty-fifth plenary meeting that the United States was willing - as indeed it is still willing - to examine carefully and thoroughly the joint memorandum as one of the possible bases for concluding a test ban treaty." (ibid., page 17)

Later in the same statement Mr. Dean said:

"My delegation is convinced that the view which we have taken of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the eight-nation plan in regard to on-site inspections is the only interpretation" (the "only interpretation", hence the United States is the only interpreter) "which both makes sense and accords with the known views of its sponsors." (ibid., page 18)

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Thus it is not the Soviet delegation that is trying to impose and authenticate its own interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum, for the Soviet Government again declared, on 19 April, that it accepted the memorandum as a whole as a basis for a compromise solution of the problem. It is the delegations of the Western countries that want, and will only accept, their own interpretation, which stresses the compulsory nature of control and verification. In other words, they say they have not even agreed to discuss this question.

As to the alleged compulsory nature of the on-site inspection provided for, according to Mr. Dean, in the eight-nation memorandum, we would refer to the terms of the document itself. In paragraph 4 it is stated that:

"... the parties to the Treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, page 2)

In paragraph 5 of the same memorandum, which deals with other measures to facilitate identification of a doubtful event, it is provided that all such measures shall be taken "in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above ..." (ibid.)

Hence, according to the terms of the memorandum itself, it is not a matter of compulsory inspection, but of an invitation which the party concerned could send to the Commission to inspect the site of the doubtful event.

These are the clear and specific terms of the memorandum. As you see, they are not consistent with the interpretation which the United States representative is trying to place on them. Far from it; they are in direct and glaring conflict with that interpretation.

What I wish to emphasize now is that it is not the position of the Soviet Union that is intransigent and rigid, but the position of the Western nuclear Powers. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have repeatedly stated that they cannot and will not make any compromise, because the only possible interpretation which, in their opinion, can be placed on the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, is the one that conforms to their ideas - the ideas with which we are fully conversant and which had been formulated several times before the eight-nation memorandum was submitted. If there is still any doubt about the fact that the Western Powers have not moved an inch from their former intransigent position, it will be sufficient to recall Mr. Dean's words at the twenty-fifth meeting of our Committee:

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"I have never at any time said that the United States is not willing to discuss a compromise. In fact I have said any number of times that we are quite prepared and quite willing to discuss the basic treaty which we drafted and submitted to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 18 April 1961 ..."

(ENDC/PV.25, page 42)

In other words, the United States representative still regards the Anglo-American draft as the only basis for discussion. This position of Mr. Dean's reminds us of the French proverb "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose".

We can only thank Mr. Dean for his frankness. In fact, if I remember rightly, during the same meeting he recalled that the Soviet representative had asked whether the United States accepted the eight-power memorandum as a compromise; his answer was negative.

It should also be noted that in the discussions in the Committee and in the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have not only failed to adjust their attitude to the new situation created by the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations, but, on the contrary, have reverted to the extreme position they took up in the past. In their zeal to oppose the memorandum of the non-aligned nations they even forgot statements made by their most eminent statesmen, such as President Kennedy, who said in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961:

"We also proposed a mutual ban on atmospheric testing without inspection or controls ..." (A/PV.1013)

Moreover, that position had already been taken by the two heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom, in their joint proposal of 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120); but now, when we are seeking a compromise solution on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum, the United States and the United Kingdom do not even deign to remember that statement and the position they adopted on 3 September 1961.

At this stage of the discussion I do not wish to dwell on the reasons for this intransigent attitude of the United States and its partner, the United Kingdom, towards the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

The question that arises now is this: Are we going to continue this futile dialogue, starting always from the same extreme positions that have brought the discussion to a deadlock; or are we going to continue negotiations on the

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discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests starting from a new compromise basis? Are the Western Powers only going to make a verbal pretence of accepting the memorandum of the non-aligned nations as a basis for future negotiations; or will they apply themselves to continuing the discussion on the basis of the proposals put forward in that memorandum? It is high time these questions were clearly and definitely answered.

It is already very difficult to continue negotiating on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the shadow of the nuclear mushroom clouds rising over the Pacific Ocean. In response to the aspirations of all mankind to see an agreement concluded as soon as possible and for ever on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has proved its willingness to continue the negotiations and to bring them to a successful conclusion by accepting the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations as a basis for future negotiations on this question. The least the Western nuclear Powers can do now is also to accept this memorandum as a basis for future negotiations - to accept it unequivocally, without reservation or prior unilateral interpretation.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): We have examined the records of the latest meetings of the three nuclear Powers, held on 24 and 26 April and 3 May (ENDC/SC.1/PV.10, 11, 12), and I must say that reading them has renewed our anxiety concerning the present state and the future of the negotiations in the Sub-Committee. Nor were the particularly important statements we heard on 7 May (ENDC/PV.32) any more satisfactory, since they revealed the negative results of these negotiations. We disapprove of the direction the debate has taken, and we hope that all members of the Committee can contribute to changing it.

We regret that it has not yet been possible to bring the negotiations into harmony with the aims suggested by the eight delegations in document ENDC/28, for it is contrary to their noble purpose to make this memorandum an occasion for major disputes between the nuclear Powers or for conflicting interpretations.

Both parties have declared that they accept our suggestions as a starting point or a basis for new negotiations - new, I suppose, in the sense of having a different approach to the problems that divide them. We are gratified at the cordiality with which they have expressed their willingness to examine our memorandum in order to find some help in it. But it appears from the arguments

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advanced that their acceptance of the memorandum is a qualified acceptance; in other words, they accept provided that certain assumptions are correct and that they are accepted as correct by the other side. What does this mean? What is meant by qualified acceptance? Is it acceptance as a starting point for negotiations, or acceptance subject to the condition that the interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum given by one of the parties should be accepted by the other party, which in turn gives its own interpretation.

In examining the eight-nation memorandum, the parties have stressed the aspects that suit them and which they consider to be its basic principles. I am speaking as the representative of Mexico and commenting on the attitudes of the members of the Sub-Committee of nuclear Powers, but I cannot and shall not give an interpretation of the common views expressed in the memorandum of the eight delegations, on whose behalf the representative of India has just made a statement. I add this parenthesis in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

We have endeavoured to help the nuclear Powers out of an impasse, and in my opinion our memorandum should not be used to help maintain the original positions; on the contrary, it should be used to justify and promote a move towards conciliation from a different starting point.

I do not think any useful purpose can be served by arguing about the meaning of the eight-nation memorandum with a view to determining whether it favours the view of one or other of the parties. As the interpretations differ, there can be no solution unless one of the parties accepts the viewpoint of the other or both parties submit to the decision of a third party.

I now ask: Are the members of the Sub-Committee prepared to accept - and by "accept", I mean undertake to abide by - the decision of the eight delegations on the disputed points raised by the interpretative study of the memorandum submitted? If the answer to this question were in the affirmative, it would be a reasonable and useful move towards attaining the objectives we all have at heart to ask the eight nations to give a joint opinion on the points in dispute, for our opinion would then put an end to the controversy and make it possible soon to conclude a treaty under effective international control banning all nuclear tests for warlike purposes.

In this connexion it can be said that, so long as the great nuclear Powers are unable and unwilling to accede to the requests of world opinion in this matter, it would be a negative and sterile gesture to seek individual statements

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of opinion, which might favour one or other of the conflicting views but would not be used to promote their reconciliation.

In spite of the unfortunate deadlock in the discussions of the Sub-Committee on points or questions of principle which the parties consider it essential to settle before examining and agreeing on other important questions also referred to in the memorandum of the eight delegations, we believe it would be very useful for the members of the Sub-Committee to study some of the suggestions contained in the memorandum, which have not yet been considered as carefully as they deserve, and try to reach agreement on them; for agreement on these suggestions could help to settle the questions which are causing the major differences at present.

Both parties have declared that they accept the memorandum as a whole as a starting point for new negotiations. It would therefore be logical - and I think we have a right to expect this - for the Sub-Committee to study all the ideas and suggestions contained in the memorandum with a view to reporting the results of its negotiations on all of them to this Conference.

For instance, we need to know whether they agree or differ on the following points:

First: the establishment of "a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis". I quote this sentence from the text of our memorandum. I ask: How do the parties envisage this system with respect to the number and specification of the "existing networks of observation posts" to be "designated by agreement" to supply data and reports on their observations to the "international commission" of "highly-qualified scientists"?

Secondly: What, in the opinion of the members of the Sub-Committee, will be the composition of the international commission of scientists? What countries would be asked to designate scientists to serve on the international commission? In what capacity would they be appointed and to whom would they be responsible? Would they or would they not be politically independent? Would they or would they not be regarded as international officials with exclusively scientific functions? Is a scientific, non-political function compatible with representation of a government?

Thirdly: If the parties declare that they accept the paragraph of the memorandum which suggests establishing a system for continuous observation and effective control, does that mean that they accept the principle of international

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control in the form of the system suggested and that, consequently, they will act in accordance with that acceptance?

We could mention other matters which the Sub-Committee should examine with a view to informing the Conference which of them it has been able to agree on, and which are the areas of disagreement in each case. Several questions of this kind suggested by the memorandum of the eight delegations have already been put by Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, and Sir Michael Wright, the representative of the United Kingdom. The problems raised by such questions should be discussed in the Sub-Committee and the result submitted to the Conference for consideration.

There is no doubt that the answers to the questions I have ventured to suggest for study, and to the questions put by other delegations, would influence the attitude of the nuclear Powers as regards the authority that they are prepared to grant to the international commission of scientists, and as regards the commission's functions, conclusions, reports and requests for information, its determination of future clarification measures in consultation with the party concerned and, in general, its decisions.

It may reasonably be expected that the nuclear Powers will have different views about what the international commission could do, depending upon whether it is intended to be a scientific body, a political body or a mixed body. In view of these considerations it seems necessary for the Sub-Committee to consider these additional matters and to suspend, for the time being, the discussion of those points on which there appears to be a deadlock - which we hope will not prove impossible to break.

In view of this situation, it seems to us that it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement fixing now - I repeat, now - the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union. The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty, because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

If we await the conclusion of both series of explosions before negotiating a treaty, it will be very difficult to avoid renewed recourse by both parties to the

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same reasons of military balance as are being invoked now to justify these tests. When the scientists and military leaders of a nuclear Power discover that the rival Power has obtained important knowledge or made technical and scientific progress that can be used to perfect nuclear weapons or for defence against them, and when they argue that this entails a nuclear disequilibrium or military advantage, the Governments of both Powers will be incapable of resisting the scientific and military pressures impelling them to answer one series of tests with another, and so on ad infinitum. Who or what could then stop their descent into the abyss?

We have never tired of repeating that we condemn tests by either side and we regret that the voice of world opinion has not yet been able to stop them. But although the nuclear Powers have persisted in ignoring the vehement demand of all the peoples, deceiving themselves with the mirage or lure of a lasting military advantage, we must all endeavour to help them fix an agreed date now, before the end of the series of tests by the two parties, so that this year or the beginning of next year may see a definite end to the senseless nuclear competition.

Any treaty freely concluded between sovereign States is based on the assumption that it will be faithfully observed. No State voluntarily signs and ratifies a treaty with the deliberate intention of violating it; but it is natural that the parties to a treaty should accept its obligations only after taking all possible political and legal precautions against its violation or evasion. It must nevertheless be recognized, however, that there is no possible provision whose inclusion in a treaty can provide an absolute guarantee of its observance. In the last analysis the essential, and the strongest, safeguard for the parties is submission to the rule of international law and ethics and respect for the pledged word.

In the case of an international instrument such as the one we are now considering, an act directly violating one of its clauses and an act giving rise to doubts or suspicions of clandestine violations would have the same effect. The inevitable result would be the resumption of nuclear tests by both parties and the continuation of a race or competition which it is to the advantage of all the nuclear Powers to stop in the highest interest of their own peoples and of all mankind.

With the present machinery of international co-existence, it is not possible to guarantee the observance of a treaty by coercive means. The only sanction for its violation is the moral condemnation of public opinion and the fact that the

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injured party is automatically released from the obligations it has contracted. If reciprocal honesty and good faith had to be dispensed with entirely, States could not conclude any freely-negotiated treaty and there would only be treaties imposed by the victor on the vanquished.

It also seems relevant to mention that tests in the atmosphere are the most serious form of rearmament, because they lead to the improvement and proliferation of the most expensive and destructive weapons.

The nuclear arms race will end by destroying the very idea of disarmament. Our slowness and difficulties in reaching agreement give public opinion the impression that we are losing sight of the gravity of the nuclear arms race, and there are some who think it would be well for this Committee negotiating on disarmament, including the Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers, to ask permission to move to Christmas Island and, if need be, to the testing grounds of the Soviet Union, so as not to lose its sense of the dramatic urgency of the world's concern. It is also thought that the delegations of the eight nations could emphasize their desire to co-operate by trying to present their views direct to the governments in Moscow and Washington.

Nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and in the stratosphere, both in themselves and by their effects, are the greatest stimulus to the arms race, and hence to the race towards a crisis. This consideration alone should be enough to persuade the great Powers to stop them, in their political interests and those of their own peoples, seeing that the danger of radioactivity and the outcry of humanity have not been able to prevail so far.

Moreover, atmospheric tests are those that entail the heaviest economic burden for the peoples, which have to bear the cost of the enormous and increasing military budgets. We all know that atmospheric tests can be recorded and identified without any doubt. Both the scientists and the Governments of the nuclear Powers have said so. If the question of atmospheric tests was not linked with that of underground tests it would have been possible to ban them long ago.

In the atmosphere of confusion, anxiety and doubt created by the nuclear arms race, there is one evident truth: we here have no right to lose hope, or to resign ourselves or to grow accustomed to the situation, for the peoples who are watching us are not falling asleep or growing accustomed to it. World opinion is wide awake and vigilant. We shall not be able to perform the duty that is ours if we continue to mark time on the same spot, because we shall not be moving towards any

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goal but the state of absolute and eternal rest in which we should be left by the turmoil of a nuclear war. It is therefore urgent, and it should be possible, to explore the question from other angles with a different approach and settle it on new bases. Such is the hope of the Mexican delegation, as it is of all the others.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): My delegation listened with the utmost interest and closest attention to the reports last Monday from the three members of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. We have also with the greatest interest and care studied the verbatim records of the four meetings which the Sub-Committee has held since the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States was transmitted (ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, 10, 11, 12). These records and the statements made last Monday give rise to some general observations.

First, we note that the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries obviously has created, if I may say so, a new situation in the Sub-Committee. All three members of the Sub-Committee have given clear evidence that they view this memorandum as a new approach and as a basis for continued negotiations.

I refer, for example, to the statement of the Soviet Government read by Mr. Zorin at the plenary meeting on 19 April and in the Sub-Committee on the same day. It is stated there that:

"... The Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set forth in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations. Thus the Soviet Government gives a positive answer to the appeal of the Governments of the States sponsoring the Joint Memorandum." (ENDC/PV.24, page 10)

When presenting this statement in the Sub-Committee Mr. Zorin explained:

"We are willing to take the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for our negotiations. The eight-nation memorandum of 16 April will be a new basis for our negotiations ... When a new basis for negotiations is accepted, this represents a new position."

(ENDC/SC.1/PV.9, page 12)

On the very same day Mr. Dean declared in a statement in the Committee:

"My delegation is quite prepared and indeed willing to give the most serious consideration to the plan of the eight new members of this Conference in the framework proposed by its sponsors."

(ENDC/PV.24, page 15)

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Mr. Godber said on the same occasion:

"I myself am most anxious that we should continue our negotiations, and I am perfectly willing to continue those negotiations using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward." (ENDC/PV.24, page 13) Statements to the same effect were made at the plenary meeting last Monday (ENDC/PV.32).

We therefore think that we are justified in concluding that all members of the nuclear Sub-Committee have accepted the joint memorandum of the eight States as a basis for their further negotiations. Indeed, the last four meetings of the Sub-Committee have also been completely devoted to this joint memorandum. The verbatim records seem also to indicate that the parties have moved a few steps nearer to each other. It is with satisfaction that we note this.

We should, of course, have appreciated it if some further steps had already been taken. We are quite aware of the fact that there have been certain difficulties, and after an examination of the verbatim records and of the various statements we would by no means characterize the situation in the Sub-Committee as a deadlock or an impasse, although, as the representative of Mexico just said in his statement, we still ask for a more unqualified acceptance of the joint memorandum.

This leads me to a second observation. The four meetings of the Sub-Committee at which the joint memorandum was discussed were devoted largely to interpretations of the memorandum. I believe this has been only natural. The joint memorandum was drawn up in part on certain new lines of thought. Furthermore, it was intentionally drafted in general terms.

In some instances the interpretations have seemed to be somewhat far off in the direction of the original positions of the parties. We sincerely hope that this will change when the Sub-Committee comes to grips with the realities.

I would like to advise against attempts to establish special schools for various interpretations of the written text. Rather than becoming bogged down in debates over which interpretation is correct, the three Powers in the Sub-Committee would be better advised to negotiate their different positions, whether these happen to be in greater or lesser conformity with the true meaning of the joint memorandum. As Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia, said in his declaration on behalf of the eight nations:

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

"It" (the joint memorandum) "is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

He went on to say:

"This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum."
(ibid.)

We hope that the period of interpretation, understandable as it has been, will soon be concluded and that the Sub-Committee will be able to embark upon sincere, objective and detailed negotiations with a starting point in the basic principles of the joint memorandum.

My delegation would greatly appreciate it if the realities of this highly important question could be dealt with in a calm and non-polemical fashion. I fully agreed with the representative of Mexico when he strongly advised the members of the Sub-Committee not to use the joint memorandum for making polemical statements or as a basis for maintaining their original positions. It might, I may say in this connexion, even be possible to create a more relaxed and matter-of-fact negotiating atmosphere - just as we found it useful to hold informal meetings of the Conference - if the nuclear Powers also held informal meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

I suppose that we are all clearly aware that nuclear tests, whether they occur over the ocean which is still called the Pacific Ocean or over the Siberian tundras, do not constitute the best background music to negotiations on a test ban treaty. On the other hand, everybody is agreed that one of the most urgent tasks is to break the spiral of the nuclear arms race within the not too distant future. The situation existing at this very moment, therefore, ought to spur all of us on to undertake the most serious efforts to reach an agreement. The time ought to be ripe to enter into detailed negotiations in what Mr. Zorin chooses to call "a businesslike manner" and Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean like to term "a workmanlike way".

The three basic principles in the joint memorandum, which has now been made a basis for the deliberations on a nuclear test ban treaty, ought to open the doors to the sincere, objective and detailed negotiations for which we are all fervently hoping.

With respect to the first principle - that is, an effective scientific and non-political control system based and built upon existing networks of observation

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

posts and institutions - detailed studies are evidently needed concerning the improvements which may be required and the new posts which might be established. These are essentially technical and scientific questions.

The second principle also - that the data emanating from the various posts should be compiled and processed by an international commission of highly-qualified scientists along with an appropriate staff - has substantially technical and scientific aspects and requires a similar consideration with regard to details.

The third principle, concerning the relations between the parties to the treaty and the commission, their consultations, the obligations of the parties to co-operate with the commission by furnishing it with the necessary data on events in doubt and by inviting on-site verification when required, should also open the door to constructive and fruitful detailed negotiations. As has been emphasized before, it must obviously be essentially a matter for the parties concerned to discuss, negotiate and elaborate the details within the general framework.

Even if we realize that continued negotiations will take some time, we feel convinced that after continued negotiations, in a businesslike and workmanlike manner, an agreement would be within reach which, to use the words of the joint memorandum, can "save humanity from the evil of further nuclear tests".

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shares the feelings of dissatisfaction and concern expressed by our colleagues this morning at the actual state of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests as well as in the Conference.

My delegation in fact has already had the opportunity to criticize the way in which the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have been treating the positive and constructive proposal submitted by the eight non-aligned countries on 18 April. In my intervention at the twenty-eighth meeting of the Conference, I pointed out that the Western Powers:

"... reluctantly agreed to discuss the draft" - that is, the joint memorandum - "but immediately attempted again to strip it of its very substance by what I must call their fantastic interpretation - that is to say, they attempted to remove its core and to smuggle in

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

their own untenable requirements of an international system of inspection, which, as we know, in the past has stood in the way of agreement." (ENDC/PV.28, page 26)

In fact a study of the records of the three-Power Sub-Committee and the discussion which took place in the plenary Conference on 7 May (ENDC/PV.32) has again made us aware that as regards the memorandum of the eight countries the delegations of both the United States and the United Kingdom continue to follow a course aimed at anything but truly facilitating the honest efforts manifested by the authors of the memorandum. By a method which they call interpretation they attempt to ascribe to the proposal of the eight countries elements which it does not contain. They attempt to change the very substance of the proposal. The basic features of the proposal of the eight countries, the features which make it a new basis for discussion, are exactly those related to the establishment of a control system which would rely on the national means of detection - means which, as is becoming even more evident, are fully sufficient for the detection of all types of nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. In fact, the recent French underground test, as reported by this morning's newspapers, was detected by a United States control system; French sources have confirmed what has been disclosed and published from United States sources.

Another basic feature of the memorandum is that, instead of the wide and far from flexible machinery of international control for which the Western Powers were pressing, it envisages the establishment of an international commission of scientists composed primarily of representatives of neutral countries.

Lastly, the memorandum solves the question of on-site inspection by proposing a voluntary invitation by the parties concerned to this international commission.

Such, in fact, is the substance of the proposal submitted by the non-aligned countries. I think this is clear to anybody at first sight, and intelligible to anyone reading the eight-country memorandum. Is there really any sense in searching for, still less building up, ambiguities and problems in these clear-cut proposals and principles? What is needed is acceptance of these principles in a straightforward and unambiguous manner, and on that basis further to negotiate and solve possible organizational and technical details of the problem that may arise. In fact, the representative of Mexico has today called for an unqualified, an unreserved acceptance, and it is such an acceptance that is needed.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

However, for this a sincere readiness to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests is a necessary pre-requisite.

Instead, what do we see on the part of the nuclear Powers? Whereas the Soviet Union has from the beginning given its unreserved support, its unreserved acceptance, of the memorandum as basis for further negotiation, the United States and the United Kingdom delegations, in addition to the bad atmosphere created by the United States tests in the Pacific, again seem to seek desperately for problems and difficulties in the solution of some technical questions, before even accepting the basic principles. Confronted with the necessity of taking a stand on the substance of the memorandum, we see them making a strange patchwork under the pretext of giving an interpretation of the proposal of the eight nations. They impute to it points which are not there and which completely reverse its sense, that is to say, an international control system provided with a wide machinery and compulsory on-site inspection.

Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, was himself forced to admit that the proposal of the eight countries does not contain these elements; at the thirty-second meeting of this Committee he expressly said:

"But, of course, paragraph 4 does not speak of any obligation to have on-site inspections at all: the only obligation of a party is to furnish the necessary facts about a suspicious and significant event to the international commission." (ENDC/PV.32, page 20)

However, he then attempted to prove, by trying hard to produce all possible quotations, that the authors of the memorandum had in mind something quite different from what they had written in their memorandum. Thus he tried to make us believe that paragraph 5 of the memorandum includes obligations in the field of on-site inspection, obligations reaching beyond the undertakings delimited in paragraph 4. However, paragraph 5 of the memorandum expressly stipulates:

"The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment." (ENDC/28, page 2),

and the principle of non-obligatory invitation to make on-site inspections is literally included, as we all know, in paragraph 4.

It is evident that the attempts of the Western Powers to use paragraph 5 of the memorandum for formulating some additional, non-implied obligations which would go beyond the framework of paragraph 4 are in contradiction to the letter and to the spirit of the memorandum of the eight unaligned countries.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

The representative of the United Kingdom attempted to follow a similar line of argument. He selected, I would say, a peculiar method for doing this. He pressed the Soviet Union to answer whether, in accepting the memorandum, the Soviet Union was willing to accept the obligation of some international on-site inspection, which evidently is not contained in the memorandum; and in order to strengthen this position he quoted - and, it seems to us, rather paradoxically - an extract from the letter from the Japanese Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev. Are we to understand that the opinion of the Prime Minister of Japan - that is, the Prime Minister of a country which is tied to the United States by a military pact and is not represented on this Committee - should be considered as authoritative in the interpretation of the memorandum of the eight unaligned countries? That seems to us to be strange reasoning and strange logic.

The representative of Italy tried to make us believe that the authors of the memorandum themselves do not have a clear idea as to what they have in mind in their document and that they even have contradictory views on the question.

My delegation appreciates the short statement made today by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, which shows clearly that the authors of the memorandum know quite well - as of course they do - what they mean by their memorandum.

The solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned countries requires a completely clear and unambiguous approach. The main thing is not to create unfounded doubts of the intentions of its authors, or even to build up the appearance of some contradictions among them, but to adopt the memorandum as the basic concept; to adopt the memorandum, which is sufficiently clear in its formulation, as a new starting point for negotiations. In this sense - the only sense which we can see in the formulation of the memorandum - this new basis has been accepted by one nuclear Power, that is the Soviet Union.

But the course taken by the Western Powers can lead only to the destruction of such basis for a compromise. Their delegations try to apply their old unacceptable demands on the question of inspection to the new concept of control formulated in the memorandum. This behaviour makes us think of a would-be magician or juggler who, performing cheap tricks, tries to cheat his audience by drawing out of his sleeve a rabbit which was supposedly not there before. The behaviour of the Western Powers strongly reminds us of such tricks. It may rightly be said that they are attempting to smuggle their rabbit - their concept

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

of control and international inspection - into the memorandum of the neutral nations, which is based on an entirely different concept. Let me say that in the present situation these tricks are so clumsy that they can fool no one. In addition, we here are not an audience watching a performance. We have serious tasks before us. The goodwill and honest efforts of the authors of the memorandum - manifested once again today by the speeches of the representatives of India, Mexico and Sweden - must not be treated as they are now being treated by the Western Powers.

Therefore the delegation of the Soviet Union was fully justified in rejecting these attempts, in the three-Power Sub-Committee as well as in plenary meetings, to deform and to distort the memorandum of the eight countries.

The interventions of the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy on 7 May could not hide the basic fact that if progress is not being made on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and if we are wasting time which could surely be used to more purpose, it is only because the delegations of the United States and of the United Kingdom refuse to adopt the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a new starting point for negotiations. Moreover, they are trying, in an undignified manner, to distort the memorandum and to impute to it their old unacceptable positions.

This confirms what we pointed out some time ago: the Soviet Union has accepted the memorandum without reservations as the new position for negotiations; the Western Powers have paid lip service to the memorandum but in fact have done everything within their power to destroy the basis offered by the memorandum.

We are of the opinion that the question of nuclear tests is so serious that the United States and the United Kingdom delegations should at last take a serious and responsible approach to the constructive proposal of the eight non-aligned countries, should accept its substance as a starting point for further negotiations and should stop their undignified attempts to depreciate and even to destroy it. Only thus may we arrive at positive results. If, however, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom continue to maintain their obstructive position, the usefulness of further negotiations on this important issue may rightly be questioned, as was done at our meeting on 7 May by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): I should like, on behalf of the delegation of Burma, to make a few observations on the subject which is on the agenda of our Committee this morning.

First, we are happy that the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests is continuing its deliberations. We hope that these efforts will be continued without respite until, like Sir Michael Wright's surviving frog, the nuclear Powers not only save their own lives but also present an anguished world with a solid pat of butter.

Secondly, as one of the co-sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, my delegation stands firmly by that memorandum. We remain convinced that it contains the seeds of a fruitful settlement. We are glad that it has been accepted by both sides as a basis for negotiation and that a beginning - if only a beginning - has already been made towards exploring its potentialities. We regret that there has so far not been a meeting of minds; but, as our Mexican and Swedish colleagues have said this morning, we hope that continuing and realistic persistent efforts will be made.

Thirdly, I should like to refer to a feeling which apparently exists in certain quarters of our Committee that the eight Powers, having presented the memorandum, are somehow withholding the further co-operation which might properly be expected of them.

Our position with regard to this was fully set out by our Ethiopian colleague on 19 April, and I cannot do better than quote him, even though this has been done several times already. On that occasion he said:

"It is our conviction that the joint memorandum must in most respects rest on its own merits, so to speak. It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks. This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum. No delegation of the eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises." (ENDC/PV.24, page 5)

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

Speaking only for the Burmese delegation, let me assure the Committee that we are not deliberately and wilfully withholding any secrets from the nuclear Powers. Given the situation which exists, agreement can only come through negotiations between them, the nuclear Powers. In Burma we have a saying that it takes a snake to see the legs of another snake. Let me make haste to say that in our country "snake" is not a derogatory term. In fact, our snakes are held in respect and even regarded with awe. In our view, the nuclear Powers are like big snakes. Only they are competent to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty. Those of us who are not so privileged as they are cannot usefully become involved in the detailed negotiations. If we were to become so involved I fear that we might find ourselves tripping over the legs which we cannot see, thereby adding to the confusion and to general difficulties. All we can do is to try to bring the two sides together and to direct their attention down a road which, we believe, will finally take them to the goal which we all desire. That is what the memorandum seeks to do.

We hope that the nuclear Powers will explore fully the potentialities which this road opens up. If they do so in a spirit of give-and-take, we feel sure that a mutually acceptable and entirely workable solution cannot long elude us.

Finally, I would like to express my entire agreement with the point made by our Mexican colleague this morning as to the imperative necessity for reaching an agreement during the pendency of the present tests in the Pacific and the Soviet tests which are to follow. If we fail to do so we shall find ourselves in exactly the same situation as when we began this Conference, and history will merely repeat itself. This awful prospect should make all of us redouble our efforts and our determination to find a solution within the next few months.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): During today's debate a great number of ideas have been submitted to us concerning how our proceedings on the problem of concluding a nuclear test ban treaty are developing. I have listened with close attention to the statements made by the representatives of India, Bulgaria, Mexico, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Burma. The Romanian delegation will examine these statements with care and intends to comment upon them in due course. Meanwhile I should like to place on record the following remarks.

Two months have elapsed since our Committee started its proceedings and, as part of these proceedings, its debates on the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. No progress whatever has been made in this connexion, as may be seen from

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the verbatim records of the discussions in the three-Power Sub-Committee. Why are we making no progress on a problem of such ardent interest to mankind? We all know why, and this is also clearly revealed by the verbatim records of the Conference. It is because of the rigid and unrealistic position of the Western Powers, which want the cessation of nuclear weapon tests to depend on acceptance of international control, although experience has taught us that national means are entirely sufficient for detecting and identifying any nuclear explosion wherever it may occur. The detection of the new French nuclear test by national means constitutes new proof in this connexion. Under these circumstances, on 16 April the eight non-aligned nations members of our Committee submitted new ideas, ideas of compromise, aimed at creating a new basis for discussion of the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty.

The Soviet Union accepted this memorandum as a basis for discussion as early as 19 April, thus passing on to a new position. The United States and the United Kingdom adhere to their old positions and, in fact, reject the ideas included in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries. The United States and the United Kingdom delegations have used various methods for this purpose. It will be remembered that during the first phase both the United States and the United Kingdom delegations tried to reject the memorandum, resorting to an avalanche of questions asking for so-called clarification; both delegations stressed particularly that these were only the first series of questions, the preliminary questions. It has become clear to all of us that this method was aimed at removing the eight-nation memorandum and rejecting the valuable ideas and suggestions included in this document.

The neutral delegations have overcome this first obstacle. In fact they have adopted the following position: what you are asking us is the very object of discussions between the three nuclear Powers. Please discuss and examine our proposals with the other side since you are not supposed to deal with the questions of substance with us. What we gave you is a basis, a starting point. You should use it in negotiations with the other side.

Today the representative of India, Mr. Lall, repeated on behalf of the eight non-aligned States sponsors of the memorandum the initial statement of these eight delegations, and I think that was very useful for our proceedings. We are happy to note that the representative of Sweden and the representative of Burma have given further strength to this statement, stressing the point that different schools as to the interpretation of the memorandum ought not to exist.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

But the Western Powers resorted to another stratagem. They accepted, but unfortunately only in words, the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for discussion; they made reservations stemming from the idea that the memorandum does not provide for compulsory international control.

I hope I will be pardoned if I say that by the very questions put to the sponsors of the memorandum on 17 April the representative of the United States showed that he had serious doubts that under the memorandum there could be cases where States would be obliged to submit to international control. To give an example, I shall quote only question 12, which reads as follows:

"Paragraph 5 speaks of consultation between the party and the commission. Does this paragraph establish an obligation to accept on-site inspection if the commission, after consultation with the party concerned, finds such an inspection to be essential to enable the acquisition of the facts about an event, as provided in paragraph 4?" (ENDC/29, page 2)

Anyone who analyses this position will realize that Mr. Dean was hinting to the authors of the memorandum that he does not agree with their proposals because they do not provide for compulsory on-site international inspection but speak of the rights of a State on whose territory the commission might be invited to carry out such an inspection.

A little later the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, said:

"The position of the eight sponsors still seems to us somewhat obscure on the precise nature of the obligations that parties to the treaty are to undertake in regard to effective international control and objective, scientific on-site inspections" (ENDC/PV.24, page 16),

and that there seemed to be:

"an element of voluntariness left to the country in which the unidentified event occurred and in which the inspection would take place, rather than an unquestioned right of inspection on the part of the international commission". (ibid.)

In conclusion, he said that without the right of inspection there could be no treaty.

Hence two conclusions may be drawn. First, Mr. Dean interprets the memorandum as a document which provides for no right of inspection but in which an element of voluntariness is left to the country in which the inspection will

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take place. Secondly, the proposal is unacceptable because it does not correspond to the position of the United States, a worn-out and very well-known position: namely, that if there is no right of inspection there can be no treaty.

Of course, the Western Powers use different guises for one and the same attitude that they adopt towards the proposal of the eight non-aligned countries, and they make assertions such as that of the representative of the United States which appears in the verbatim record of the twenty-fourth meeting of our Committee:

"My delegation is quite prepared and indeed willing to give the most serious consideration to the plan of the eight new members of this

Conference in the framework proposed by its sponsors." (ENDC/PV.24, page 15)

But, as the Latin proverb says, non valet protestatio facto contraria: the facts are contrary to Mr. Dean's declaration that he intends to remain within the framework of the eight-nation proposals. The facts prove that he does not accept this framework and that, further, he adheres to his old, unacceptable - and I have to say this - unrealistic position which provides for compulsory international control.

I do not want to go into further details. I would only like to recall the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, at the Subcommittee meeting on 24 April (ENDC/SC.1/PV.10, page 14) to the effect that the principle of effective detection through an international network of control posts should be accepted.

Our Conference meeting on 7 May marked a new phase in the tactics of the Western Powers characterized by the assertion that international control is compulsory and that the eight-nation memorandum can be interpreted only as providing for compulsory control. On that occasion the representative of the United States asserted that there are cases when, on the basis of paragraph 5 of the eight-nation memorandum, "on-site inspection is found to be the only means by which the necessary facts can be obtained by the international commission" (ENDC/PV.32, page 20), and when the memorandum implies an obligation for the respective State to submit to on-site control.

Mr. Dean said:

"My delegation is convinced that the view which we have taken of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the eight-nation plan in regard to on-site inspections is the only interpretation which both makes sense and accords with the known views of its sponsors." (ENDC/PV.32, page 18)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

We shall not, however, follow Mr. Dean in all his attempts to make us read "is compelled to admit" where the text says "might invite". We would only like to show the long road covered by the Western Powers in a relatively short period, that is in less than a month - from the rejection of the proposal of the eight non-aligned countries because it implies voluntariness on the part of the territorial State as concerns international control, to the assertion that the memorandum contains the opposite thesis, namely that of compulsory international control, and that any other interpretation is out of the question.

Thus the Western Powers adhere to their old position. This makes us doubt whether there is any interest on the part of those Powers in the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. If they are animated by a serious desire to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty under prevailing conditions, they ought to agree immediately to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union taking as a starting point the provisions of the eight-nation memorandum. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are asking for a number of prior clarifications. Logic demands that we start by adopting the principles included in the memorandum as a basis. During these negotiations clarifications will certainly be obtained on all questions, doubts and fears which the United States and United Kingdom delegations are manifesting.

The eight-nation memorandum is a basis for negotiation, and we have heard statements - general statements, it is true - by the Western delegations to the effect that they agree with it as such. Why, then, have these negotiations not started; and why are they, instead, going round the memorandum in the hope that maybe it will disappear once and for all?

The time has come for this Conference to hear an open explanation. We need this explanation from the United States and United Kingdom delegations so as to know whether we are to continue our efforts in this direction or to concentrate upon other objectives. I would like to make it clear, however, that if the opportunity offered by the eight-nation memorandum is ignored, and no nuclear test ban treaty is concluded, then the entire responsibility will be upon the Western nuclear Powers. Whatever they do, nobody and nothing will be able to shift this responsibility from the Western Powers to others.

Our Conference has not lost patience so far; we wish to continue our negotiations with calm and responsibility. But there are certain limits which should not be exceeded. The desire for negotiations should not be interpreted as a misunderstanding of the exact situation.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

It is for these reasons that the Romanian delegation hopes that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom will also understand the situation exactly as it should be understood - take into account the data of the present time, and act accordingly.

Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India has tried diligently to inform itself of the discussions which have taken place in the Sub-Committee dealing with this important matter of ending nuclear tests. We have also read again the verbatim record of the discussion that took place in the Conference yesterday, so as to inform ourselves fully of the views of the countries which are, so far - I must be forgiven for putting it this way - said to be negotiating for a test ban treaty on the basis of the memorandum which India had the honour to co-sponsor with seven other delegations in this room.

We are glad, of course, that these discussions are continuing in the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee. It is a good thing that people should discuss matters, rather than break off negotiations. This is a fundamental in international life today. But we do regret that real negotiations have not started. I have tried to inform myself again today of the meaning of the word "negotiate". We went to the New Oxford English Dictionary, volume 6, page 81, to find out whether the parties concerned were really negotiating, because we had our own doubts as to whether they were. We found that "to negotiate" means: "to hold communication or conference for the purpose of arranging some matter by mutual agreement". Equally it means: "to discuss a matter with a view to some settlement or compromise".

Now I would request the three nuclear Powers to ask themselves: Are they really trying to reach a compromise? Are they really trying to settle this matter? With great respect to them, there is not enough evidence that they are doing so. It seems to our delegation that there is an element of unreality in the consideration of this issue in the Sub-Committee. I want to establish this fact, and I beg the three nuclear Powers to take note of it: not once in their discussions - not once - either in the Sub-Committee or in this room have they been realistic enough even to mention that if they go on talking and talking about this matter other countries will soon start testing weapons. In fact today three countries are testing weapons, and another country has given an indication that soon it may be testing weapons again; and there are other countries in the world which are able to test weapons. Let us say this quite frankly and brutally to these three countries: if they think

(Mr. Lall, India)

that their scientists are better than our scientists - by "our" I mean the scientists of the rest of the world - they are mistaken, plain mistaken. Let there be no doubt about this. They are by their unrealistic talk bringing nearer the time when there will be more testing in the world.

Is this fair? Is this responsible behaviour?

The other day a very distinguished scientist who has been awarded the Nobel Prize said in an open letter - which our Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, quoted in the Indian Parliament on 2 May - that the current atmospheric tests by the United States, in terms of genetic damage, would bring about 3 million deaths. Three million deaths! This distinguished scientist, Professor Pauling, also stated that if the human race survived this nuclear holocaust which has started - and this is a nuclear holocaust: three million deaths through the current tests - the human race would as a result of the recent Soviet tests reap a total of twenty million grossly defective children and embryonic neo-natal deaths.

Now what sort of responsibility is this? Does this arise out of a feeling for national security? Has any country the right to kill scores of millions of people in the interests of its national security? These deaths are not occurring in the United States and the Soviet Union alone. These deaths will be recorded all over the world. We have the right - we are not doing this because we are strangers standing at the door of this nuclear club; we have the right - to protest strongly against this situation. We have the right to demand that these countries reach agreement through real negotiation.

Some weeks ago these countries could say, "We have no basis for negotiation; we have no basis for agreement". They cannot say that any more. They have told us that we have provided them with a common basis for negotiation: and the purpose of negotiation is to reach agreement. With that common basis there, it is their duty to negotiate and to reach agreement. It is not fair to the rest of the world that millions of people should be killed as a result of tests which have taken place and tests which are going to take place. This is not a fairy tale. The other day some of our delegations were visited - I know the delegations of the two co-Chairmen were visited, and so was ours, and I suppose others too - by two victims of the Hiroshima bomb. They told us that, as a result of the recent Soviet and the new United States tests, people are today dying in Hiroshima from radioactivity. Today they are dying. Each time a bomb is exploded, people die in Hiroshima. Why? Because these poor people are so saturated with radioactivity that the slight

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increase in radioactivity - which, of course, we are sometimes glibly informed by certain scientists is "nothing at all" - results in deaths today whenever a bomb is exploded in the atmosphere.

Why are these facts being hidden from us? Why are the nuclear Powers not mentioning these facts in their negotiations? Why are they not mentioning the fact that, if they go on testing, other countries will soon be testing? All this is unrealistic. We are sorry that they are talking in these unrealistic terms. It is not correct that they should do so. It is not proper that they should do so. These are not small factors; these are factors which are of immensely greater importance than the so-called security which these Powers are trying to achieve. I say this deliberately: the so-called security, the phantom of security, which they think they are achieving by nuclear tests. Their own leaders have said that they cannot find security in the development of arms, and yet this is still being attempted. I myself seldom quote newspapers, for various reasons, but I want to glance with the Committee at certain passages in the London Economist of 5 May (page 449). The London Economist is a journal which needs no certificate from me or from anyone else in this room. I am dealing with this issue of the phantom of security and the phantom of closing missile gaps and other gaps. This is what the Economist says:

"Mr. Khrushchev probably broke the moratorium on nuclear tests in order to try to close a real gap between Russia and the United States, which had alarmed him by increasing its military spending partly in order to close a 'missile gap' that apparently turned out to be only a phantom."

It is that sort of hard, scientific, military consideration which we are told leads to tests. So hard, so scientific, that it is a matter of chasing phantoms. Is this fair? Is this proper? I repeat: the nuclear Powers have no basis for this unrealism today. They have accepted the memorandum as a basis for discussion. If they have accepted this memorandum as a basis for discussion, it is high time some results were achieved.

There is another element of unrealism in the actual consideration of this memorandum by the three Powers which comes out very clearly when one reads the discussions in the Sub-Committee. As the representative of Sweden said, there is a game going on of trying to interpret the memorandum. This is not necessary. The time is over, as he said, for this game. It is important to get down to real negotiation. The memorandum is not that obscure. Various representatives

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speaking here today have quoted again the passage from Mr. Sahlou's speech on 19 April when he said (ENDC/PV.24, page 5) that there are vast areas to be filled in by negotiation. But "negotiation" means to talk with a view to reaching agreement, not with a view to standing on the sides of the document and pretending to approach it, which is what is going on at the moment.

I should like to say that apparently it is not true that the countries have accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiations here. If they had, they would have reached agreement by now or been well on the way to doing so. Let us be frank about this. If they had accepted this document as a basis for negotiation, they should have made much more progress by now. Let us revert to the position that they have accepted the document as a basis for negotiation. Then it is their duty - not just to themselves or to those of us who sit in this room, but because of these effects from nuclear tests of which I have tried to give some evidence - to reach agreement. It is not fair to us that this matter should go on and on. No wonder Prime Minister Nehru, speaking in Parliament on 2 May, said:

"It was very surprising that even on this vital matter, where differences were not great, agreement had not yet been reached."

He went on to say:

"I have appealed previously here in this House and I would again appeal to the two great Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to desist from nuclear tests."

Mr. Nehru concluded that these tests were a crime against humanity, a crime against the survival of the human race.

We do request the three nuclear Powers to negotiate in fact and no longer in mere words. This is too serious a matter for this sort of treatment. There is a basis here which will lead them to an agreement, if they so desire; and we request them to desire an agreement, because they owe this agreement not only to themselves but to us; they owe it to the millions of people who will probably be killed as a result of the tests which took place last autumn and which are taking place today. No country pleading the interests of its security has the right to perpetrate this nuclear holocaust which, I submit, has already started.

Now I should like to say this. The joint memorandum contains in its infrastructure, built into it, an adequacy of principles to meet the requirements of both sides. If this had not been the case, we would not have put it forward. We put this document forward after the greatest care and consideration. I can

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say for the Government of India that this was a matter over which we exercised a great deal of care. I myself was on the telephone to Delhi many times in order to clarify various points before we could get agreement on this memorandum. It is a serious step which eight countries took. We did not take it lightly. Built into the infrastructure of the document are the principles which both sides require. In that light it is not necessary for any country to raise questions of principle as to the memorandum.

We would request you to see that, if you put an agreement into effect on the basis of this memorandum, then the results which all of you desire - and I will not spell them out, but will say categorically "which all of you desire" - will follow. There will be a cessation of tests. There will be the type of inspection which all of you want. There will be the type of international determination by an international commission which all of you want. There will be a system of observation posts which will meet the requirements of the case. Let not anyone bring up scientific considerations here and say: "This is not accurate enough scientifically." There have been too many statements, both scientific and political, by responsible people on both sides to indicate quite clearly that there is no one correct scientific view in this matter. So it is useless telling us that this is not scientifically adequate. No one here is in a position to say that, not even on the basis of the best scientific advice that he can adduce, because there are many views regarding this matter.

Seriously, gentlemen, here you have a document with built-in principles which will meet all of your requirements. Why should you not put it into effect? You have international elements in it, strongly. You have the provision of shared responsibility between the international elements, the national elements, and the countries in which there might be a suspicious event. As a result of this arrangement of responsibility, if any country which became a party to this treaty were to fall down on its responsibilities there would be such serious consequences that we do not believe that any country would deliberately invite them.

Finally, I should like to say that it is important that we should all remember, in respect of this particular discussion and the agreement which should follow on the basis of this memorandum, and also in connexion with general and complete disarmament, that none of us in considering these matters is writing domestic law; none of us is writing law for his own parliament or his own senate to enact in detail. We are writing agreements here between sovereign States. We are writing

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agreements which must be acceptable not only to one parliament or two parliaments or six parliaments, with their particular points of view, but to the States of the world. We are people - let us admit it - who look at life differently. We have different backgrounds, different customs, different laws and different systems. But we all have a common purpose, and that is to reach agreement.

No matter how powerful and important a country is today - and please let me say this with a great sense of responsibility to all the powerful countries represented in this room - it may not be so powerful tomorrow in relative terms. Others can do what it is doing. Others will do what it is doing, if the world survives and if time continues for a little while.

Therefore, no matter how powerful a country it may be, it has no right to try to write a treaty here in terms exclusively of its domestic law; it should not say: "Such and such is the only treaty which can be passed by the legislature of my Government". If legislative bodies are going to take the narrow view that treaties must live up exclusively to the standards of their domestic law, on that basis there can be no international agreements. International agreements can be arrived at only by give and take, and give and take means that the kind of agreements we are writing must be acceptable to a wide base of countries. It is that kind of agreement which can be written on the basis of the joint memorandum.

There is therefore no reason why an agreement should not be written and there is no reason why the nuclear holocaust, which regrettably has already started, should not end right away.

Our Prime Minister made an appeal on 2 May. It is not really up to me to repeat his appeal, but I do so. I do so because it really does behove these countries to negotiate seriously. It should give them a sense of satisfaction to reach agreement on the basis of the joint memorandum which we have worked out. Instead of that, what do we get? We get endless words from them, and this is not fair in the present situation.

I shall again turn to the London Economist. In an article headed "Final Tests?", the Economist of 5 May stated, in conclusion (page 450):

"Thus after the current series the military case for atmospheric testing may cease to be strong enough to outweigh the moral and psychological case against radioactive fall-out with its unknown consequences for future generations."

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Now, what is implicit in this? Implicit in this is the suggestion that even in undertaking tests today any country is really playing with the situation, because it is chasing this phantom of security in the wrong way. Tests are embarked upon because it is assumed that somehow or other they will do such and such to the issue of national security, but they might well fail to do it. This is not a position which should be permitted to continue. We do appeal again to these three nuclear Powers to reach agreement.

We should like to say that we, as outsiders to this issue of nuclear testing, do feel that we can confidently say to the nuclear Powers that, if they really accept the joint memorandum and set up a system based closely on the memorandum, they will achieve their purposes of a test ban agreement with adequate inspection arrangements, with adequate elements of internationality, and with adequate responsibility shared between all the parties to the treaty. We do ask them not to delay in reaching this agreement.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I should like first to say, on behalf of the United Kingdom, a word of thanks and appreciation to the eight delegations that have been working so hard in their way at this problem while the three nuclear Powers have been discussing the question in the Sub-Committee. I wish to thank them for the statement which they have submitted to us today. I want to say to them that my delegation understands and appreciates their motives.

In listening to the interventions this morning, I was particularly glad to hear the representative of Sweden say that he strongly urged the nuclear Powers not to use the joint memorandum as a basis for polemics. The representative of Mexico expressed the same feeling in his intervention. That is an appeal which I warmly welcome and with which my delegation has every intention of complying. I can say this with all the more feeling because, as I may perhaps remind members, the negotiation to reach a nuclear test ban treaty did not begin with the opening of this Disarmament Conference. It did not begin a few months ago. It goes back to 1958. I myself have now been engaged for three and one-half years in that negotiation.

If the members of the Conference will take the trouble to look at the records of the three-Power nuclear negotiations, they will find that through all those three and one-half years the voice of the United Kingdom has been raised time and again against the treatment of this subject in a spirit of polemics. From the

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beginning we have said that this is too important a subject to treat in that way. For these three and one-half years we resolutely refused ever to be drawn down the path of polemics in the nuclear test ban negotiations. I only hope that this appeal - and I may revert to this later in my intervention - will also be heeded by other delegations at this table. I could not help noticing that all the interventions of the communist delegations at the table this morning contained an element of polemics, which I for one deplore. I want to get away from polemics altogether, I would hope for ever, but before I do so I must reply briefly to the intervention of the representative of Bulgaria, because he raised the question of certain remarks made by the United Kingdom Minister of State, Mr. Godber.

I would say to the representative of Bulgaria in a most friendly way that, in addressing to me observations about taking documents in the nuclear field as a basis of discussion, he is addressing himself to someone who has had some experience. In 1958 my delegation, together with the United States delegation and the Soviet delegation, accepted as a basis for discussion the 1958 experts' report (EXP/NUC/28), which the Soviet Union had joined in compiling. For three years we negotiated on the basis of that report. We very nearly reached agreement. We agreed on the text of seventeen articles and two annexes out of about twenty-four articles and three annexes. Then one morning the Soviet representative said to us, "My Government no longer recognizes the validity of the report on which we have been negotiating", and he tore up the 1958 experts' report.

I say this to my colleagues because one has to learn from experience. That experience must teach us of the care with which it is necessary to approach the question of taking a particular paper or document as a basis of discussion. One has to be clear what it is that one means. One has to be clear that one's partners in the negotiation, in taking a particular paper as a basis of discussion, are doing so with their hand on their heart and not with their tongue in their cheek. We consider it extremely necessary that there should be no misunderstanding on what one says when one is taking a paper as a basis of discussion.

That was the motive behind the statement by Mr. Godber which the representative of Bulgaria - I am sure without meaning to do so - quoted out of text. Mr. Godber's point was that the United Kingdom accepts the memorandum as a basis of discussion. He said so specifically at the meeting referred to, the

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twenty-fifth meeting; he said, "I am so willing; I have been willing all along." (ENDC/PV.25, page 5); and later he and I myself have made plain that in saying that we mean as a basis not merely of discussion but of negotiation. What Mr. Godber was concerned about on that day was to make it clear that the essential point for the United Kingdom is the attitude of the Soviet Union, and that if the Soviet Union is still maintaining its extreme position of no obligation to accept any international control, then we are not yet embarked on a round of compromise. That is what he was referring to, the attitude of the Soviet Union, when he used the words quoted by the representative of Bulgaria:

"But what I am saying is that, as far as my Government is concerned, on the fundamental, basic question we have not progressed at all."

(ibid., page 3)

What he was talking about was progress in terms of the attitude of the Soviet Union. He wanted to make it clear, and he was right to do so in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, that before embarking on negotiation - as we for our part consider we have now embarked - we are not complying with the extreme Soviet position.

Turning to the substance of the matter, I would like to repeat that the United Kingdom is not only willing to accept as a basis of discussion the eight-Power memorandum, but has so accepted it and is, in so far as it is within its power, already embarked upon the process of negotiation upon it. We want to pursue that negotiation actively. If there is to be a treaty there must be negotiation, and if ever we abandon negotiation we abandon the hope of a treaty. That is something to which we in the United Kingdom will not resign ourselves.

I was glad to note a statement by the representative of Sweden that, in his view, the nuclear test Sub-Committee is not in an impasse. It is in a difficulty, but I would agree that it is not in an impasse. There is no reason why its work should end in an impasse, and I know of no reason for maintaining or alleging that it is in an impasse, except possibly for some statements made by the Soviet representative throwing doubt on his willingness to continue negotiation. But I should be reluctant to believe that the Soviet delegation does not want a treaty, and therefore I am reluctant to believe that it does not want to continue negotiation. In any case, my Government does wish to continue negotiation and to pursue it actively.

I should like to say, further, that the intervention of the representative of Mexico seemed to me to be an intervention of great importance, needing careful

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study. In particular, he put a number of questions to the Sub-Committee on which at first hearing my delegation has views which it will be very ready to express in the Sub-Committee. If this process enables us to embark on real negotiation at last, we for our part will be more than glad.

I noted with perhaps special interest a remark which he made - I took it down as I heard it - to the effect that in his view nuclear weapons testing is one of the most deadly forms of rearmament. I would agree. I would agree that nuclear weapons testing is a deadly form of rearmament. For that reason my country has worked unremittingly for the past three and a half years to find a means of putting an end to it. But if one admits that nuclear weapons testing is a form of rearmament, then I think it follows that an agreement to stop nuclear weapons testing is a form of disarmament.

I think this is an important point because our Soviet colleagues in the negotiation have lately been adopting the position that they are not prepared to accept any form of international inspection short of general and complete disarmament, and that they are not prepared to consider any form of international verification in the nuclear test context in advance of or separately from an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Indeed, they use the second argument, that they could not accept verification in the field of nuclear weapons testing because nuclear weapons testing is not a form of disarmament. This is a matter to which we may have to revert, and indeed I should like to do so. Meanwhile, I want to say again how much I found that was interesting, valuable and worthy of study in the intervention of the representative of Mexico.

If, however, we are to make the progress we want to make in the Sub-Committee, or outside the Sub-Committee, then there must be willingness on all sides; and I do not think we must overlook the fact that this nuclear test negotiation is an extremely complicated and difficult one which will not be solved just by simple and easy phrases: continual constructive effort will be needed at every stage of the negotiation if we are to begin to make real progress, if we are again to start making the progress we did make in the earlier phases of the negotiations.

I should be less than frank if I did not underline the difficulty which is caused in our negotiations by the continual series of Niets which has been given by the Soviet delegation to proposals which we thought might facilitate progress. I will not even try to list all of them, but there are some to which I should like to refer.

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The Soviet Union has told us since these disarmament negotiations began that it is not prepared to have a meeting of scientists from the nuclear Powers. It refused our suggestion of a meeting of scientists from the nuclear Powers to facilitate our negotiations.

The Soviet Union declined our invitation to submit data on the efficiency of national detection systems - an important point because the Soviet Union has maintained that national detection systems are now sufficiently able themselves to solve the problem of detection. We asked the Soviet representatives to give us the information on which this claim is based. They refused. That was a second "No".

The Soviet Union has said to us that it is not prepared to accept any form of international inspection short of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union has said to us that it is not prepared to have neutrals included in inspection teams, if there are ever to be inspection teams.

The Soviet Union has told us that it rejects the participation of representatives of neutral delegations in the work of the Sub-Committee. The Soviet representative expressed emphatically his refusal of that suggestion before representatives of neutral delegations themselves had even had time to comment.

Only in the last day or two the Soviet delegation has told us that it rejects an international technical study group, as proposed by the representative of Italy. At our last meeting - and I found this particularly depressing - the Soviet representative told us that he considered it of no use, of no avail, to discuss in the nuclear test Sub-Committee the question of the composition and powers of the international commission proposed by the neutral Governments.

If we are to make progress we really do want on occasions some more positive and constructive replies from the Soviet representative to meet the willingness which we ourselves bring to the problem.

I would go back to the question, which I dealt with at the beginning of my intervention, of the desire of taking this problem out of polemics. It seemed to me that the interventions this morning - I say so with respect - of the representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania did constitute the continuation of a sort of ritual dance of polemics around the question of nuclear testing and around the question of the neutral memorandum. I will not pursue that matter except to say that I do not wish to be drawn ever down that road of polemics. On the contrary, what my delegation wants to do is to pursue active negotiation on

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the lines so well pointed out to us by the representative of Burma in his intervention this morning, in which he appealed to us to explore further together the road of agreement. We wish to do that, and we wish to do it in the spirit of the eight neutrals who have already contributed to our work.

It is my hope, and I feel sure I am justified in expressing it, that in the continuance of negotiation, in a renewed attack upon the problem, we may count upon their further sympathy and, if necessary, active help.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we have listened to a number of important statements, which gave a fairly complete picture of the course of the negotiations in the three-Power Sub-Committee and assessed the situation in which we now find ourselves.

In one of the statements made today it was asserted that in their negotiations the nuclear Powers do not take fully into account the real situation. Perhaps this is true, and in this connexion I should like to say a few words about the real situation as it exists today.

The real situation consists above all in the fact that the United States and United Kingdom tests are in full swing and now cover not only tests underground and in the atmosphere, but also in outer space.

As the Press informs us today, there are serious objections in scientific circles of the United Kingdom to the proposed high-altitude testing of nuclear weapons by the United States in the area of Johnson Island. In this connexion a proposal is put forward that a meeting of United States and United Kingdom scientists should be arranged to study the possible consequences of this test.

The United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, however, speaking in the House of Commons on Tuesday, stated that the responsibility for these tests is solely on the United States Government; the fallout will be negligible; the experiment is of the greatest importance for defence; and the result from the scientific point of view is indeterminate but at any rate interesting. Mr. Macmillan categorically refused to accept the proposal of a Labour Member of Parliament, Mr. Foot, who asked that a list of scientists in favour of this United States high-altitude nuclear explosion be submitted.

This is a fact which exists and which for some reason the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, did not mention today; but he criticized us for our negative reply to the question of meetings of scientists to deal with

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questions relating to the elaboration of a treaty on the discontinuance of tests, whereas Mr. Macmillan gives a negative reply in regard to a meeting of United States and United Kingdom scientists - that is, scientists of two friendly countries.

The second fact is that reports received in the last few days mention an underground test carried out by France and the detection of this test by the national detection system of the United States. This fact demonstrates two things. First, it confirms the thesis which we have repeatedly put forward that all tests, including even underground tests of low yield, can be detected by national systems of detection. Secondly, France is not only conducting tests but refuses to take part in the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests, and has not once declared that it will adhere to a treaty concluded by the three Powers. This is a fact which we must take into account.

If the Western Powers believe that it will be possible to conclude a treaty which will prohibit nuclear weapon testing by the three nuclear Powers, whereas the fourth nuclear Power, France, an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, will not adhere to this treaty and will not undertake any obligations, then I am bound to say that such a treaty will not come into being, because the Soviet Union will not sign such a treaty. I want this fact also to be taken into consideration. We cannot allow a situation where an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom would quite calmly continue its weapon tests while ignoring completely the demands of world public opinion for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests by all Powers. Therefore, if the United States and United Kingdom representatives consider that it will be possible to conclude a treaty to which France would not be a party, they should not harbour any illusions on this score. Those are the facts which, I maintain, we should really take into consideration.

I should now like to say a few words about the actual situation at the present moment, how it has revealed itself in the course of our discussion and about which the representatives of various countries have spoken today.

We have heard various assessments as to whether there is an impasse or not, whether genuine negotiation or mere talk is going on, whether the principles set forth in the joint memorandum of the eight unaligned countries are really accepted or whether there is merely a pretence of accepting these principles, that is various assessments of the actual situation were put forward. The United

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Kingdom representative spoke about his disagreeing with the representatives of communist countries. I can equally say that I do not agree with the representative of the imperialist Power who spoke on this occasion.

What was said by Sir Michael Wright today shows once again that the United Kingdom Government, like the United States Government, wants to pursue the negotiation actively but, contrary to the meaning of "to negotiate" given in the New Oxford English dictionary, which the representative of India mentioned today, it intends to pursue the negotiation, not in order to reach agreement, but merely in order to continue talking in general. Indeed, how can any agreement really be reached, if the United States and the United Kingdom - as has been quite clearly shown throughout our discussion - officially state that they accept the eight-Power memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations or even as a starting point for negotiations, whereas in fact they reject the basic principles of this memorandum?

What Sir Michael Wright said today in reply to the Bulgarian representative sounded completely unconvincing. The Bulgarian representative had referred to a statement made by Mr. Godber regarding the interpretation given by the United Kingdom Prime Minister to the eight-Power joint memorandum. I should like to recall once again and quote slightly more of Mr. Godber's statement than the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, did. At the twenty-fifth meeting Mr. Godber quoted a statement by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, concerning the proposals of the non-aligned countries. Mr. Godber said:

"When he" (Mr. Macmillan) "was asked again to clarify just what the neutrals' proposals were, he said:

'As I understand it, the proposals would not make verification compulsory; it would be only permissive. But if it is to be only permissive we are really back where we stood before.

The question is: is it to be compulsory or permissive? If the point were granted by the Russians - and we have made this point over and over again - the whole situation would be changed. It is that point which once more we have thought it our duty to put forward!'" (ENDC/PV.25, page 9)

Thus in this statement by Mr. Macmillan two things are quite clear:

1. The United Kingdom Prime Minister considered and still considers that in the eight-Power memorandum verification is "not compulsory" but "would be only permissive". That is the first point.

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2. He says: "If the point were granted by the Russians ... the whole situation would be changed" - that is, if the Russians were to say that they were in favour of compulsory inspection, the situation would change; unless the Russians granted this point, the United Kingdom would maintain its old position. That is the meaning of the position of the United Kingdom Prime Minister.

Sir Michael Wright, in explaining it today, in fact did not clarify anything at all. He said that the essential point for the United Kingdom was the position of the Soviet Union on inspection. But the Russians have stated, and state, that they accept the provision regarding inspection as formulated in the proposals of the eight Powers - in the way that your Prime Minister interpreted them. Why are you not satisfied with this? Why? Why do you demand that we adopt a position on inspection which is not the one proposed in the eight-Power memorandum but the one which you advocate? Why? Why do you say that you accept the proposals of the eight Powers as a basis, if in fact you demand that we should adopt, not the position of this memorandum, but your position, which is concerned with compulsory inspection? How then can you say that you accept the proposals of the eight Powers as a basis? Is it not obvious to anyone who can read and write that you reject the basic position set forth in the joint memorandum? I think that you cannot deny this after the statement made by your Prime Minister.

You want us to adopt, not the position set forth by the eight Powers - we have officially stated that we accept it - but your fallacious position. But we have told you frankly that your position, the old position which you are defending on the question of inspection, is unacceptable, and we shall not adopt it. We have adopted the position proposed by the eight Powers. If you state that you accept this memorandum as a basis, you too should adopt this position. Why do you cling to your old position? For you know that there can be no agreement on the basis of your old position. It means you do not want agreement. That is the whole meaning of your position. Why do you refuse to adopt the position of the unaligned countries? We are not demanding that you adopt our position, but the position of the unaligned countries. We have adopted it, but you have not. You continue to cling stubbornly to your old position, an unacceptable, fallacious position, and even accuse us of not wanting to achieve agreement, that we are not making any move to meet you.

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We made a move to meet the proposals put forward by the eight Powers. We adopted this new position in regard to inspection, because previously we spoke of rejecting any inspection whatsoever, but now we say that this inspection is admissible on a voluntary basis. You cannot deny that this is a new position. But you are clinging to your old position.

Mr. Godber tried to find out from Mr. Tsarapkin how this position was to be understood, how we understand all this. We, of course, do not understand it in the way you do. That is quite clear, because you simply maintain your old position - compulsory inspection as decided by the international body. But this is not the position of the eight Powers. You yourself have admitted it. Your Prime Minister admits it. Then why do you demand that we adopt your position, and why do you refer to the eight-Power memorandum in this connexion?

At the meeting on 24 April Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"Mr. Chairman, you have again expressed dissatisfaction with the reply I have just given you concerning inspection.

In view of this, I should like to read to you once more the relevant passage from the statement by the Soviet Government dated 19 April:

'... the question of inviting the Commission for the purpose of verifying in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events should be decided by the States themselves. All these propositions undoubtedly deserve attention and could be a useful basis for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests

The Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations'. (ENDC/SC.I/PV.10, pp. 28-29)

"So, you see, the Soviet Government, in its statement of 19 April, accepted this suggestion to invite the Commission, as it is formulated in the proposal of these eight non-aligned States itself. I will quote it again:

'Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty' (that is, the States) 'could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt!.

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"The Soviet Government accepts this. I do not know what further evidence the United Kingdom representative needs. I cannot produce more authoritative testimony than the actual statement by the Soviet Government to prove that it accepts this proposal of the non-aligned States". (Ibid.)

That was what Mr. Tsarapkin said on 24 April. But what is it that you do not understand? Is it not clear from this explanation and from this reference to the official statement of the Soviet Government that we agree that it will be possible in individual cases to invite scientists, members of the international commission, to ascertain in loco the nature of the events which are in doubt. Is that not clear? But it is we who will do this, upon our own invitation, and not somebody else. That is a perfectly clear position. What is it that is not clear to you?

But you do not want this. You want something else. You want the Commission to decide and to order the despatch of an inspection team on your demand. That is what you want. But we tell you that there can be no agreement on that basis because it is your old position which you are defending. On that old position there can be no agreement. We want to make this clear so that you may have no illusions. While you go on adhering to your old position on the question of inspection and on other questions which I have not time to talk about now, it is also perfectly clear that you are adhering to your old position also on the question of international control posts, on the question of the function, rights and powers of the International Commission - if you adhere to your old position there can be no agreement and negotiations will be useless. What we want are productive negotiations that would lead to an agreement.

That is why, when there was talk here today about how these negotiations should continue, we naturally put the question: are our partners prepared to carry on not simply conversations but real negotiations on the basis of the definite principles set forth in the eight-Power memorandum. If you accept these principles, then we have a definite basis and a definite framework for further negotiations and for the elucidation of a number of specific questions. But if you want to conduct negotiations on questions of detail after having given negative replies in regard to the main controversial questions of principle, nothing will come of it. We shall not give you any reply on these particular questions of detail until you give us a straight and clear answer whether you

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accept the principles set forth in the eight-Power memorandum on the controversial main questions.

You know what these questions are. Mr. Godber himself has spoken about them. There are three points - three questions - a system of national control posts, an international commission and inspection. These are the three main questions of principle. In regard to these three questions there are perfectly clear answers in the memorandum. Do you or do you not accept these answers as they stand? That is the question which has to be settled. Unless you give clear, positive answers to these questions, there is no point in carrying on negotiations. The negotiations would inevitably assume the nature of conversations beating about bush.

One of the representatives who spoke today - I think it was the representative of Burma - said, as did also the representative of India, that the memorandum does not answer all the questions and that the task of the negotiations is to fill in the missing parts of the picture. This is quite right. Of course the memorandum does not provide answers to all the questions. But what is being proposed to us now is not to fill in the missing detailed parts of the picture, but to change the picture itself. That is the point. It is now proposed to replace one part of the picture by a different part. That is what is being proposed to us.

Therefore, we say: "No - we are prepared to fill in this picture jointly with you, but take this picture as it stands. Otherwise there is no point in filling it in. How are we going to fill it in, if you want to make radical changes of principle in the basic features of the picture?"

That is why the suggestions made by the representative of Mexico cannot be carried out until the Western powers give a clear answer to the question whether they accept the principles set forth in the eight-Power memorandum in regard to the main controversial questions. If they accept these principles without reservations - as someone said this morning - if they accept without reservations what is set forth in the principles of the eight Powers, we are prepared to conduct further negotiations with them on all the details. But they do not give this reply or they give a negative one.

The suggestion of the representative of Mexico that we might continue the discussion on other matters, postponing answers to certain questions of principle, is unrealistic. But Mr. Padilla-Nervo is well known as a prominent statesman and

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is a man of great experience, and I think that he realizes very well, of course, that there can be no fruitful negotiations if we set aside the main questions and deal with matters which arise out of the solution of these main questions. Is there any point in conducting negotiations on these particular individual points of detail when the main questions have not been settled? What would be the result of such negotiations? Nothing, except waste of time and the creation of false illusions that something is being done to achieve an agreement.

But an agreement cannot be achieved without settling the main questions of principle. That is quite clear. There can be no agreement that excludes the main questions. Such a treaty is impossible. Therefore, it is necessary at the outset to reach agreement on the main questions, and there are three. In regard to these three questions there is a clear answer in the memorandum. Be so good, Western Powers, as to give us a clear and precise answer: Are you prepared to accept what is formulated and expressed in the eight-Power memorandum in regard to these three main questions, or do you want to interpret all this in your own way?

The representative of Sweden and the representatives of other countries have said that they are against our occupying ourselves with interpretations of the memorandum. We too are against this, but what we want is that the eight-Power memorandum should be accepted as it stands, and that all the basic principles expressed in the memorandum should be accepted as they stand. We are not interpreting anything, we accept the memorandum as it is, but the Western Powers want to interpret it to suit themselves. Prime Minister Macmillan who understands what the matter is about has said that the memorandum does not make verification compulsory. Why then do you interpret it as making verification compulsory? Why do Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber say that compulsory verification, compulsory inspection, follows from the memorandum? Why does Prime Minister Macmillan admit that it is not compulsory according to the memorandum, yet you demand that it should be compulsory?

Well then, it is your interpretation, and I would even say that it is not the interpretation of your Government, but the interpretation of its representatives here, because I think that Mr. Macmillan expresses the Government's point of view more than the United Kingdom representative does here in the Committee. That is the situation. I want to be frank, so that there may be no illusions, and from what I have said it is perfectly clear that the Soviet Union takes its stand on the memorandum. It accepts the principles of the memorandum as they are stated,

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and we want the Western Powers also to take their stand on the memorandum and accept the principles contained in this memorandum in regard to the main questions, as they are stated. If the Western Powers agree to this, we are prepared to carry on negotiations with them on the draft treaty itself. If you still try to lead us in a different direction, if you still try to give your own interpretations and demand that we agree with these interpretations, if you insist on your old positions, then we tell you that such negotiations will be useless. We shall not agree to this, and there can be no agreement on this basis.

As a result of today's discussion we should have a clear idea of the prospects for our future negotiations. The Western Powers must adopt, in regard to the main questions, the position set forth in the memorandum as it stands, and then on this basis we can speedily reach agreement on all the specific matters of detail which arise out of the solution of these main questions. This is our position.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened to the statements by the representatives of India, Mexico, Sweden and Burma, and have found them very useful and helpful. I was particularly interested in the series of questions posed by the representative of Mexico, to which we shall give most careful consideration. We will also reflect on everything else that the representatives of India, Mexico, Sweden and Burma said, and in due course we shall be prepared to make comments.

I suppose the question whether one is negotiating in good faith is always a subjective question. We thought we had been negotiating in good faith since 1953. We prepared a complete treaty, which took several years to draft, and I submit one will not find a polemical word in it. It is based upon reports of experts which at one time both the Soviet Government and Soviet scientists completely accepted, as the representative of the United Kingdom so clearly and forcefully stated this morning.

Speaking on behalf of my Government, we shall of course be prepared to continue these negotiations. I might say that before one negotiates one at least has to find out what one is talking about, and I would submit that it is quite evident that the Soviet Government accepts the eight-Power memorandum as interpreted by the Soviet Government.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I should like to exercise my right to make one or two comments in reply to the last intervention of the Soviet representative.

As I listened to him, Mr. Zorin, in spite of his saying the contrary, appeared to me to be doing exactly what the representatives of Mexico and Sweden had appealed to us all to stop doing: that is to say, continuing to interpret the memorandum.

His intervention consisted very largely of trying to interpret the memorandum in the sense desired by the Soviet Union. I should prefer, in the stage we have now reached, to heed the appeal of the eight neutral countries and to proceed to negotiate. Mr. Zorin became so heated in his desire to continue his interpretation that he brought his hand down angrily on the table time after time. I would remind Mr. Zorin of a remark which he himself addressed - at, I think, the twenty-ninth meeting of the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference - to the then representative of France, Mr. Moch: "Jupiter, you are angry; that means that you are in the wrong".

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-fourth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tarabanov, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Bulgaria, Mexico, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Burma, Romania, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 11 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

